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Case No. 930550-CA 
District Court No. 10958 
Priority 4 
-oOo-
REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee's (Marc's) Statement of Facts asserts that the 
child custody evaluator expressed some concerns about the fact that 
Alicia was living with her fiancee, Mr. Pomeroy. (Respondent's 
Brief at p. 8-9). This statement inappropriately implies that 
Alicia was either living with or planning to live with Mr. Pomeroy 
without benefit of marriage. It improperly suggests a deficiency 
in her moral standards with regard to the issue of child custody. 
The child custody evaluator noted that Alicia was 
planning on living with Doug Pomeroy, as would be expected on her 
marriage. (T. 137). He recommended that Alicia's move to Oregon 
to live with Mr. Pomeroy and the children conditioned on marriage* 
(Trial Exhibit 6 at p. 18). There was no evidence at trial that 
Alicia was living with Mr. Pomeroy or planned to do so with the 
parties' minor children without benefit of marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
ALICIA HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE AND 
SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS WERE EITHER INADEQUATE OR SO 
LACKING IN SUPPORT AND AGAINST THE CLEAR 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE COURT'S DECISION TO 
AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFER PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE 
CHILDREN TO MARC IF ALICIA MOVED FROM SUMMIT 
COUNTY. UTAH. 
To successfully challenge the trial court's ruling, 
Alicia is required to demonstrate that the Findings are inadequate 
to support the court's ruling or the evidence so lacking in support 
of the findings that they are clearly erroneous and that the trial 
court's ruling thereon is therefore an abuse of discretion. Barnes 
v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Crouse v. Crouse. 817 
P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). Alicia has so marshalled the evidence. 
Although Marc contends that the findings are supported by 
the evidence and not against the clear weight of the evidence, he 
fails to demonstrate that the evidence and findings properly 
support the court's automatic transfer of physical custody of the 
children to him should Alicia move from Summit County, Utah. 
Neither the findings nor the evidence support the trail court's 
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order modifying child custody provisions of the parties' Decree of 
Divorce. 
Marc claims that the evidence amply supports the court's 
finding that: 
While the mother has been the primary 
caretaker, which I find is true, the children 
are nearly equally bonded to both parents. 
The father has a significant, active, open 
involvement in the lives of the children... 
The children have, during what I might call 
the tender years, been primarily in the care 
of their mother. Naturally, they would be 
expected to be very close to their father, but 
in this case we have a uniquely interested 
father. We have someone who is extremely 
committed to these children, who has 
previously encountered the experienced of 
being separated from children of a prior 
marriage, and whose wife of the former 
marriage has even stated that he has gone to 
extraordinary steps to maintain a healthy 
relationship with those children. (T. 33). 
He acknowledges that the evidence demonstrates the 
children are more closely bonded to Alicia. Although he argues 
that the child custody evaluator was ambivalent about choosing the 
best placement for the children, that same evaluator recommended 
the children continue in the primary care of Alicia if she was to 
move from Utah and that it would be extremely disruptive to them if 
the children were to be separated from their mother. (T. 143). 
The evaluator was ambivalent about whether or not Alicia 
should stay in Utah to enable Marc's weekly visits with the 
children, but felt it was in the best interests of the children for 
them to continue living with Alicia as primary caretaker. Mr. 
3 
Peterson recognized advantages in the prospective move the Oregon. 
(T. 128). 
Marc also asserts that the evidence supports the court's 
finding that he is a committed father, because he was committed to 
his children by a prior marriage. Although Marc is a good father 
to the parties' children, the Court failed to refer to any 
pertinent factors demonstrating its finding that Marc was 
"extremely committed to these children" or any of his attributes 
supporting such a finding with regard to the parties' children; he 
wanted to be involved in their lives, but there was no evidence 
demonstrating that he had the time to care for them and meet their 
daily needs as Alicia has always done. The evidence showed that 
Marc visited with the parties' children approximately two and one-
half weekends per month (T. 91), that he had always kept long work 
hours from approximately 7:00 a.m. or earlier until 7:00 p.m. or 
later during weekends and on Saturday mornings each week (T. 10, 
29) and that he would have to hire a nanny to care for the children 
if they were to live with him (T. 39-40). Under these 
circumstances, the strong relationship the children continue to 
have with Marc demonstrates that Alicia has lived up to her 
responsibilities as the primary caretaker of the children, and is 
supporting the children's relationship with Marc. It is not a 
factor to support a change of physical custody. See e.g. Crouse v. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). 
To deduce that this bonding is a result of Marc's 
involvement during the short hours he is with the children is to 
4 
negate the value and impact of the constant care, and the 
importance of that care, that their mother has always giving the 
children. Other than Marc's promises of working less to be with 
the children, there was no evidence based upon his past conduct to 
suggest that he was committed to meeting the children's needs on a 
daily basis. He testified that he would limit his work hours if he 
were physical custodian of the children because he has arrived at 
a position in his therapy practice where he could reduce his hours 
(T. 11), but he had not done so. 
Marc also contends that there is sufficient evidence 
supporting the finding of the Court that: 
It is speculative whether a move to Corvallis, 
Oregon, would be successful or permanent. In 
the summer of 1992, plaintiff met Douglas 
Pomeroy, who lives in Corvallis, Oregon, and 
plaintiff indicated that she and Mr. Pomeroy 
intend to marry. However, Mr. Pomeroy and 
plaintiff have not yet married and there is a 
potential for conflict if the family were to 
move in with Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the 
move to Corvallis, Oregon, would enhance the 
children's educational environment nor 
plaintiff's career potential. It is a high 
risk move for plaintiff and the children. (R. 
214) . 
Marc asserts this finding is supported because there was 
uncertainty as to whether Alicia or Mr. Pomeroy would marry. There 
was no evidence of such an uncertainty. There was never a June 
1992 wedding date as asserted in the brief of Appellee, page 15. 
The wedding date in January 1993 was postponed by Alicia until June 
1993 in an effort to accommodate Marc's wishes, allow further 
communication between the parties and, specifically, to allow the 
children to attend the wedding of Marc's brother in the middle of 
June. (T. 72, 170). No evidence concerning the parties" marriage 
plans indicates any potential for conflict; it demonstrates 
Alicia's accommodations to Marc. Nor is there any evidence of 
potential conflict if the family were to move with Mr. Pomeroy. 
Although Mr. Pomeroy has no children, it was the evaluator's 
opinion that he was a stable person, sensitive to the children's 
needs and their relationship with Marc and that he had a good 
relationship with Alicia and the children. (T. 169, 171, 174, 
175) . Mr. Pomeroy earned sufficient income to support the 
household. (T. 177, 146). In the evaluator's opinion, Mr. Pomeroy 
was a positive factor in the lives of the children (T. 121, 122, 
emphasis added) , and a two parent home was definitely in the 
children's best interests. (T. 128, 138). The only evidence 
presented on the educational environment in Corvallis, Oregon, 
demonstrated that there were significant advantages to the school 
system there because it addressed what Alicia perceived as the 
children's specific educational and enrichment needs. (T. 106-
107) . 
Marc is further incorrect in his assessment of the 
evidence concerning Alicia's career enhancement if she were to move 
to Oregon. The evidence showed that Corvallis, Oregon, was the 
center for her field of artistic glasswork, in which she was 
involved prior to the parties' marriage and was attempting to 
reenter (T. 69, 168, 198), that artists were able to establish a 
career in that field in Oregon, and that there was no such 
opportunity available for her in Utah. (T. 69, 168-199, 202-204). 
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There is no objective evidence to support the Court's finding that 
the move to Oregon was risky, would not be successful and permanent 
or that it had potential for conflict. Nor did the evidence 
demonstrate that the move lacked advantages to the children's 
education or plaintiff's career. 
Marc claims contends that the evidence also supports the 
Court's finding that, "The children do not wish to Corvallisf 
Oregon." (R. 215). This is inaccurate. Although the children 
understandably became anxious about the relocation and were 
concerned about being separated from their father, as would be 
normal, none of them expressed a preference to live with Marc, and 
all of the children were accepting of the move. (T. 122, 124, Ex. 
6 at 16) . There was no evidence that the children desire to be 
separated from their mother and live in Summit County, Utah, while 
she lived in Corvallis, Oregon. The custody evaluator clearly 
stated that such an arrangement would be extremely disruptive and 
contrary to the children's best interests. 
The evidence also failed to demonstrate that it would be 
in the best interests of the children to remain in Utah if Alicia 
were to reside in Corvallis, Oregon, as Marc contends. The Court 
found that: 
"Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, 
recommended the children remain in the 
physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in 
his report that it would be in the children's 
best interests to remain in Utah and, in 
reading his report as a whole, it is clear 
that the recommendation was a close call. The 
present custodial arrangements have fostered 
happy, well-adjusted lives for the children." 
(R. 215). 
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The custody evaluator clearly and specifically 
recommended that, if Alicia were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, she 
should still continue as the children's primary caretaker. 
(Exhibit 6, p. 18). He stated it would be extremely disruptive and 
contrary to the children's interests if Alicia were to live in a 
separate state from the children (T. 143) , and that it would be 
more disruptive to the children for them to be separated from 
Alicia than for them to live in a separate state from their father. 
(T. 143-144). No evidence supports the trial court's finding, 
which places importance of location of the children above their 
relationship with Alicia, their primary caretaker, with whom they 
had thrived. The Court's finding in this regard is so lacking in 
evidence so as to be contrary to the clear weight of all evidence 
and, therefore, erroneous. 
Marc further claims that there is substantial evidence to 
support the Court's concerns about Alicia's stability is reflected 
in the finding that: 
"Although there are no defects in plaintiff's 
capacity or willingness to function as a 
parent, there is some questions about 
plaintiff's stability because of her several 
changes of residence during the year since the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce herein." (R. 
215) . 
In so doing, Marc points out that the evidence showed 
Alicia had changed her residence since the divorce. Although this 
is true, the record fails to indicate any instability on her part 
in changing homes; she sold the marital home at Marc's suggestion 
because she could not afford to maintain it following the divorce. 
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Her change in residence was beyond her control and deliberated by 
her with a focus on meeting the specific needs of her children. 
(T. 38, 75-81). No objective evidence shows otherwise. Alicia 
took the same deliberate approach with regard to her upcoming 
marriage to Mr. Pomeroy and the move to Oregon. She assured that 
the children and Mr. Pomeroy had a good relationship, that they 
liked where they would be living and that any emotional concerns of 
the children were appropriately addressed. 
Marc asserts that the Court was correct in its finding 
that "Both parents have an equal depth of and long-term desire for 
custody. The father has shown a commitment to the children." (R. 
215) . This finding, however, is not supported by the evidence, and 
the record as a whole clearly demonstrates it to be erroneous. 
Although Marc testified that he had developed his business to a 
point where he was able to leave it in the hands of other people, 
he had not done so and continued working ten to twelve hour days, 
including every Saturday morning. (T. 29-30). He had historically 
kept these work hours and, based on his past employment schedule, 
there was no evidence he would not continue to do so. The child 
custody evaluator recognized that Marc's commitment to the children 
was far different from the demonstrated commitment Alicia had 
historically provided to the children during their entire lives. 
The evaluator, Mr. Peterson, viewed Marc's desire for custody to be 
one of short duration, concerned more about having frequent contact 
with the children than actually wanting custody. He viewed Marc's 
Petition to Modify to be more of an attempt to prevent Alicia from 
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moving from Utah than an expression of his desire to undertake the 
day-to-day responsibilities of caring for the children. (Ex. 6 at 
p. 17). In fact, Marc's own testimony made it clear that his plan 
was to provide surrogate care for the children if they were to live 
with him. (T. 39, 40). 
Similarly, the Court's finding that, "...it is unlikely 
that, if the children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, plaintiff 
would continue their religious training" is either not supported by 
the objective evidence and against the clear weight of evidence or 
an impermissible consideration of Alicia's personal religious views 
and practices as set forth in Point * , infra. 
Upon her marshalling of the evidence adduced at trial, 
Alicia has sufficiently demonstrated that the Court's findings set 
forth above are so lacking in support that they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, erroneous. Marc has 
failed to demonstrate otherwise. The Court's ruling automatically 
transferring physical custody of the parties' minor children to 
Marc if she relocates from Summit County, Utah, is not supported by 
the evidence. The trial court decision should be reversed to 
prevent an injustice from occurring to Alicia and the children. 
Point II 
MARC HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE PROPRIETY 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF ALICIA'S 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
WITH REGARD TO RELIGION IN MAKING ITS CHILD 
CUSTODY DETERMINATION. 
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A. Marc is incorrect in asserting that the trial court 
did not consider Alicia's personal religious views in its 
determinations. 
Marc argues that the trial court did not consider 
Alicia's personal views in making its child custody orders, but was 
concerned with Alicia's intent to expose the children to different 
religions. This assertion is contrary to both the clear record of 
the proceedings below and the result of that trial. It is clear 
from Judge Young's statements that the trial court not only 
considered Alicia's personal religious views but compared her 
religious practices with those of Marc in modifying the child 
custody orders of the Decree of Divorce. At trial, Judge Young 
questioned the child custody evaluator as follows: 
Judge Young: 
The Witness: 
There were two other areas that you focused on. 
One, you focused on the issue of religion. I think 
the Court is not in a position to deal much with 
the issue of religion, as you are aware. However, 
do you have an opinion — it seems to me to be 
relatively obvious if the mother moves to Oregon 
that her predisposition about religion, the 
children are not going to be involved in religion, 
at least the L.D.S. religion in Oregon. Wouldn't 
that seem consistent to you? 
I do not know that is true that she would disregard 
that and not involve them in church. I mean, there 
would be a fear that might happen, but I think, 
particularly if she is told that she needs to do 
that, I suspect that she would. My concern about 
the religious thing is just the fact that that's 
the way the children have been raised in the past 
and a sense that I have that that ought to be 
respected and maintained. 
Judge Young: Continued for the children. 
Mr. Peterson: Mm-hmm (yes). 
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Judge Young: But if the mother has the attitude that she is 
going to expose them to other religions and so on. 
do you expect that that present religious practice 
would be followed? 
Mr. Peterson: I really don't know. I think that's just real 
speculation. 
Transcript at 144-145, emphasis added. 
Later, when Alicia's counsel attempted to have Alicia 
testify on the sort of exposure she wished to give her children to 
other religions, Judge Young prevented this evidence from being 
presented, stating that the case was not going to turn on religion 
and enough evidence had been presented on that issue. (T. 151). 
However, in the trial court's ruling the Court stated: 
"The mother, while she testifies that she is 
in favor of the children having religious 
training consistent with their life, and that 
is part of their life, the move to Corvallis 
is not compatible with the religious training 
that has been provided to the children. The 
mother does not intend to attend religious 
services. It is not very practical to take 5, 
7 and 8 year old children and drop them off, 
and she said she would go with them when they 
were there. I think that smacks of the 
incredulous. She does not have a commitment 
to the religion. And to think that she is 
going to go there to foster it causes me to 
doubt her credibility. I just don't think she 
would do it, and I don't think I would expect 
her to do it. So, it is far more compatible 
for the children to remain in their religious 
environment in which they are present in." 
(T. 237-238, emphasis added). 
The Court thereafter entered its specific finding of fact 
that: 
"14. During the marriage, both parents and the 
children attended the LDS Church and were 
active in the LDS Church. Since the 
separation of the parties, plaintiff has 
ceased to be active in the LDS Church. 
12 
Defendant remains active and wishes to keep 
the children active in the LPS Church, The 
Court finds that it is unlikely that, if the 
children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, 
plaintiff would continue their religious 
training." (R. 215, emphasis added). 
The trial court's statements clearly show that it 
considered Alicia's personal religious views and practices in 
changing the child custody orders rather than her desire to expose 
the children to any other religions. 
B. The record fails to support the trial court's 
finding concerning the children's religious upbringing. 
The trial court not only considered Alicia's relative 
religiousness in modifying the child custody orders of the Decree 
of Divorce, but in so doing specifically found that: 
"Defendant remains active and wishes to keep 
the children active in the LDS Church. The 
Court finds that it is unlikely that, if the 
children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, 
plaintiff would continue their religious 
training." (R. 215). 
This finding is unsupported by the record. The evidence 
demonstrated Alicia's active and supportive involvement in the 
children's religious upbringing. There was no evidence of any 
break in continuity in the children's religious upbringing since 
the parties' divorce while the children were being raised by 
Alicia, and no objective evidence indicated that Alicia's 
historical conduct with regard to the children's religious 
upbringing would change. She is the parent who delivered and 
picked the children up from church each Sunday and continued to do 
so even on weekends when Marc did not visit with the children. She 
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supported the children and attended each of their religious eventsf 
she placed great importance on their religious ideals and planned 
to continue with their religious training regardless of the 
children's place of residence. (T. 35, 148-150). There was no 
evidence that she planned to change the children's religion. The 
fact that Alicia no longer attends the same church service as Marc 
and that she wishes to have the children learn about other 
religions is not objective evidence which supports the Court's 
finding. Being exposed to different religions is quite different 
from being raised in a different religion or changing one's 
religion, and there was no evidence that Alicia had any such plans 
to do so. 
The evidence and objective evidence presented to the 
trial court with regard to the children's religious upbringing was 
so insufficient and lacking as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
C. The trial court's consideration of Alicia's personal 
religious beliefs and practices in determining child custody 
placement is error. 
The trial court's consideration of Alicia's religious 
beliefs and practices in determining child custody placement 
constitutes error where there was no religious incompatibility 
between Alicia and her children. 
There was no objective evidence presented to the trial 
court indicating any conflict between the children's religious 
concerns and Alicia's personal religious beliefs and practices. 
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She has always supported the children in their religious endeavors 
and beliefs, had no plans to discontinue their religious upbringing 
or religious affiliation and believed it very important for the 
children to continue their involvement in the LDS religion. 
(T. 35, 148-151). Alicia, in great part, assured that the children 
attended their church each Sunday by personally taking them to 
their service. (T. 149-150). Alicia's personal religious belief 
and the manner in which she practiced her devotion was not contrary 
to the children's religious upbringing, and there was no objective 
evidence presented as to any "religious incompatibility" with the 
children, making it contrary to their best interests for Alicia to 
continue as their primary caretaker. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a court may 
consider religious compatibility in determining competing child 
custody claims. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 at 41 (Utah 
1982). Although the courts in Utah have never determined what 
constitutes "religious compatibility" or lack thereof, other courts 
considering the issue of religion in child custody determinations 
hold that any such consideration is proper only where the health or 
welfare of the children is at stake. See e.g. Welker v. Welker. 
129 N.W. 2.d 134 (Wis, 1964); Gould v. Gould. 342 N.W. 2.d 426 
(Wis. 1984); Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 92 Sup. Ct. 1526 32 
L. Ed. 215 (1972), Zummo v. Zummo. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super 1990). 
Whatever Alicia's personal religious beliefs and 
practices may be, the record does not suggest that they are 
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incompatible with her children's religion or inimical to their 
health or welfare. 
One of the most important individual rights guaranteed by 
both the first amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Utah is that of religious freedom without 
government coercion. Our court in Utah recently reaffirmed this 
freedom in Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 
935 (Utah 1983), in its analysis of our constitutional guarantees, 
observing that: "A general characterization of all these 
provisions, when read together, is that they are designed to 
protect religious exercise and freedom of conscience in general... 
and to prevent the imposition of civil limitations based on one's 
religious beliefs or lack thereof." Id. at 935. 
Marc contends that the trial court did not attempt to 
dictate Alicia's religion. But what the trial court did was 
unconstitutionally coercive. It gave Alicia the unconstitutional 
choice of following her religious beliefs and practices or 
jeopardizing her custodial rights. 
The court in Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho 
1993) recognized that the presentation of such a choice is clearly 
improper, holding that the denial of custody to a parent because of 
certain entertained religious beliefs, or lack thereof, would be 
denying that parent a civil right because of such religious 
opinions or beliefs. Id. at 953. In underlying Osteraas case, the 
trial court found that the parents were equal in almost all 
respects, but inappropriately tipped the scales in favor of the 
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father and awarded custody to him based upon a consideration of the 
mother's religiousness when she desired to relocate with the 
parties' minor children. In Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 
Super 1990), cited in the Brief of Amicus Curiae, the court held 
that it was constitutionally impermissible to decide a child 
custody dispute in whole or in part on a consideration of apparent 
relative devoutness. Id. at 1152 (emphasis added). 
In taking into consideration Alicia's religious beliefs 
or lack thereof and her practice of not attending the religious 
services of Marc and the parties' children, the trial court 
interfered with Alicia's religious freedom and favored organized 
religion over her decision not to participate. This favoring of 
organized religion, as well as interference with Alicia's free 
exercise, violates not only the first amendment of the United 
States Constitution, but also the Constitution of Utah. Article 1, 
Section 4 (1896), and penalizes her for her lack of participation 
in an organized religion. 
The trial court clearly and inappropriately considered 
Alicia's religious practices and beliefs in its custody 
determinations. The specific findings of the trial court with 
regard to her religious practice and the statements of the trial 
court make this clear. The overwhelming evidence and objective 
evidence presented at trial fails to support the court's specific 
finding that it is unlikely that Alicia would continue the 
children's religious training in Oregon. The objective evidence 
presented to the trial court demonstrated that Alicia and her 
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children were religiously compatible, with no conflicts with regard 
to their religious upbringing. Accordingly, the court's findings 
with regard to religion should be overturned, and the court should 
make its own findings of religious compatibility between Alicia and 
the children. The trial court's decision preventing Aliciafs 
relocated to the State of Oregon and transferring primary custody 
of the children to Marc in the event of that relocation should be 
vacated due to the impermissible consideration given to appellant's 
religious beliefs and practices in the trial court's ruling. 
Point III 
ALICIA CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A NEED FOR PAYMENT 
OF HER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY; SHE 
SHOULD BE AWARDED THESE FEES AND COSTS AND 
THOSE SHE INCURS ON APPEAL. 
Marc claims that Alicia failed to establish a need for 
payment of her attorneys' fees because she was entitled to receive 
a property settlement from Marc, and because he pays her alimony 
and child support. His assertion fails to recognize that his 
payments to Alicia are for the purpose of supporting the household 
expenses she incurs for herself and the parties' children where she 
has no income, except what she receives from Marc. (T. 76). This 
support award was made as a part of the Decree of Divorce entered 
in April 1992 prior to the expenses Alicia incurred for attorneys' 
fees and costs in defending this subsequent divorce modification 
proceeding. As a share of her equitable distribution of property 
in the prior divorce action, Alicia is entitled to receive a 
property settlement from Marc due April 1, 1997. However, the 
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settlement monies were not available to her prior to the time of 
trial or the divorce modification proceeding. Alicia had no 
present access to the property settlement at the time of the 
divorce modification trial. The household expense needs upon which 
her alimony and support payments were based did not include her 
attorneys' fees and costs to defendant the divorce modification 
proceeding instituted by Marc. There was no assertion that Marc 
did not have the ability to pay, and the evidence clearly 
demonstrated that he earned approximately $150,000 per year at the 
time of trial. Marc's claim suggests that Alicia should pay her 
attorneys' fees by not paying of her household expenses or 
cannibalizing her share of equitable distribution if and when that 
is received. 
The evidence was clear that Alicia had a present need for 
Marc's contribution towards her attorneys' fees and costs, there is 
no evidence that Marc did not have the ability to contribute nor 
that the fees and costs claimed were unreasonable. In considering 
these factors, as is required by Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P. 2d 559 
(Utah App. 1993), the trial court should have awarded Alicia her 
attorneys' fees in defending Marc's Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce, and it was abuse of the trial court's discretion in its 
failure to do so. Accordingly, Alicia should be awarded her 
reasonable attorneys' fees in this matter and, upon the same basis, 
her attorneys' fees on appeal. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 839 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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Point IV 
REGARDLESS OF HOW THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED, IT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DECISION TRANSFERRING 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' MINOR 
CHILDREN TO MARC IN THE EVENT OF ALICIA'S MOVE 
TO OREGON. 
It is clear that the Court must consider the best 
interests of the children and the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of the parties in determining whether any change in 
circumstance supports a change of the child custody orders of the 
parties' Decree of Divorce. Joraensen v. Joraensen, 599 P.2d 510 
(Utah 1979); Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.3(2)(a). The personal desires 
and conduct of the parents is irrelevant to such a consideration 
unless it has an impact on the children's best interests. See e.g. 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). In 
considering the factors pertaining to the children's best 
interests, the trial court's choice in competing child custody 
claims should be based on function-related factors. Pusev v. 
Pusev. 728 P. 2d 117 (Utah 1986). These factors include the 
identity of the primary caretaker, the parent with greater 
flexibility to provide personal care, the identity of the parent 
with whom the children has spent most of his or her time pending 
the custody determination, and the stability of environment 
provided by each parent. Id. at 118. 
The evidence presented at trial on each of these 
function-related factors clearly shows that the best interests of 
the children are served under Alicia's primary care. The children 
are happy and well-adjusted under her care, and the trial court so 
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found. (R. 215). The child custody evaluator recommended that the 
children continue living under Alicia's primary care and believed 
it would be extremely disruptive for the children to live in a 
separate state from their mother. (T. 143-144). The evaluator 
believed that Marc would be able to continue his strong 
relationship with the children through a more appropriate 
visitation schedule with larger blocks of time when he is available 
to visit with the children. (T. 128-129). 
The only change of circumstances which in any way would 
support a review of the child custody orders in this case is 
Alicia's relocation to Oregon. In requiring an automatic transfer 
of the physical custody of the children to Marc in the event of 
such a move, the trial court inappropriately placed the importance 
of the location of the children above the relationship the children 
have with either parent and, specifically, their primary caretaker. 
Although Marc argues that the trial court weighed the children's 
best interests, putting them before either his desires or those of 
Alicia, the evidence does not demonstrate that this occurred. The 
trial result is not based upon the function-related factors that 
are to be considered in making a child custody determination. 
The parties anticipated that there might come a time when 
either of them would relocate from Park City, Utah, and the Decree 
of Divorce specifically provides of notice in such event. It also 
provides that if the parties are not able to reach agreement on any 
issue concerning the children's upbringing, then they are first to 
attempt mediation. (R. 67) . There has been no change of 
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circumstances that was not anticipated by the parties at the time 
of the Decree of Divorce sufficient to justify a reopening and 
revision of the child custody orders or a specific change in the 
award of primary physical custody to Alicia or the designation of 
the children's primary residence as being with her. (R. 2) . There 
has been no change in the manner in which she has cared for the 
children and raised them. Although a change in the geographical 
location of her residence would occur if she were to move with the 
children from Summit County, Utah, this alone should not justify a 
change in the child custody orders. 
In most all instances where a primary caretaker plans to 
relocate with the children, the courts allow the children to be 
relocated where there is a legitimate reason in the children's best 
interests for the custodial parent to move to another state. See 
e.g. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 242.62 788 P.2d 328 (1990); Jaramillo v. 
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N. Mex. 1991).; Ditto v. Ditto, 628 P.2d 
777 (Or. App. 1981); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wy. 1993). The 
relocations are generally upheld so long as the custodial parent 
has good motives for the move. More than mere inconvenience to the 
non-custodial parent must be shown to defeat the custodial parent's 
right to relocate. Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wy. 1993). In 
Love, the court noted that: 
It would be incongruous for a court, when 
presented with a custodial order originally 
based upon the best interests of the child, to 
refuse to support the efforts of the custodial 
parent to maintain and enhance their standard 
of living, albeit in another jurisdiction. So 
long as the court is satisfied with the 
motives of the custodial parent in seeking the 
22 
move and reasonable visitation is available to 
the remaining parent, removal should be 
granted. Id. at 1288 (citation omitted). 
Similar to the primary physical custodian of the children 
in the Love case, Alicia's relocation from Summit County, Utah, is 
to enhance the life for herself and her children through a marriage 
and opportunities which would generate her an income so she could 
become self-sufficient before the termination of Marc's alimony 
obligation to her. No such opportunities exist for her in Park 
City, Utah. No evidence suggests she would not continue to 
function as a good parent to her children as she has in the past or 
that the children would not continue to be happy and well-nurtured 
under her care. Under the circumstances, the trial court was wrong 
in providing for an automatic change of primary care of the 
children in the event of Alicia's relocation, and abused its 
discretion in doing so. The decision of the trial court should be 
reversed and Alicia should be granted leave to relocate to Oregon 
with the children. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in 
modifying the Decree of Divorce to provide for an automatic change 
of physical custody of the children from Alicia to Marc in the 
event Alicia relocates from Summit County, Utah. The findings of 
the trail court are inadequate or so lacking in evidence to support 
the court's decision that they should not be upheld. The trial 
court's decision providing for an automatic transfer of physical 
custody if Alicia moves from Summit County should be reversed to 
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correct the significant errors of the trial court in modifying the 
Decree of Divorce. Alicia should be granted leave to move from 
Summit County, Utah, with the parties' minor children and continue 
in her role as their primary physical custodian, under whom they 
have thrived. 
Alicia has clearly demonstrated her need for attorneys' 
fees and should be awarded all of her attorneys' fees and costs 
related to the divorce modification proceeding, as well as those 
associated with this appeal, and the matter should be remanded to 
the trial court for determination of the same. 
DATED this day of August, 1994. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
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